

Towards Better Measurement of Government: A Review of OECD Experience

A review of the OECD's Working Paper 1 (Towards Better Measurement of Government): moving towards the publication of Government at a Glance

1 Background

The Public Governance Committee of the OECD has mandated the Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate to assess the feasibility of developing comparable data and indicators of good government and efficient public services. This project aims to provide good empirical data and indicators of good government. The intention is to move, on a phased basis, to the production of a publication provisionally entitled *Government at a Glance*, to be published in late 2009.

The OECD has undertaken an initial assessment of available data, alongside a detailed literature review (OECD, 2005). Following on from this, in late 2006 the OECD produced the first working paper gathering together existing data, entitled *Towards Better Measurement of Government* (OECD, 2006a). Here, the results of this first working paper are assessed, with a view to determining the findings for Ireland in a comparative context. The next steps to be undertaken by the OECD in developing the database are also outlined, alongside a discussion on the data set and its proposed extension.

2 The OECD approach

The OECD has an overarching data classification scheme, outlined in Figure 1. There are three main categories: public sector activities; production stage; and functional sector.

The public sector activities include 'general government', 'other public sector' and 'private sector in the public domain'. The 'general government' and 'other public sector' categories are relatively self-explanatory. The category 'private sector in the public domain' recognises that many governmental activities are now undertaken by private sector organisations, but with significant public funding. As noted by the OECD (2006b):

Figure 1 The *Government at a Glance* data classification scheme

Activities of:	General government				Other public sector	Private sector in the public domain				
	Central	State	Local	Social security funds						
Production stage:	Revenues	Inputs	Public sector processes	Outputs and intermediate outcomes	Final outcomes	Antecedents or constraints				
Functional sector:	General public service	Defence	Public order and safety	Economic affairs	Environmental protection	Housing & community amenities	Health	Recreation, culture and religion	Education	Social protection

Source: OECD, 2006a

The effect is that the key test for the inclusion of data or analyses in *Government at a Glance* will be that they describe events that contribute to or can be significantly attributed to activities that are undertaken with public funds, whether within or outside of core government, and whether those funds represent a direct transfer or are provided in the form of an implicit guarantee.


The production stage category includes six variables: revenues, inputs, public sector processes, outputs, outcomes, and antecedents or constraints that contextualise government efficiency and effectiveness. A more detailed version of this element of the classification is outlined in Figure 2. This categorisation draws heavily on the logic model (Boyle, 2005). Revenues relates to sub-central government revenues. Inputs are classified on a functional basis. Processes include structure, institutional and managerial arrangements and activities. Outputs and outcomes are largely as defined in Boyle (2005) though intermediate outcomes are included in the output category by the OECD. The antecedents or constraints variable is intended to provide contextual material to inform interpretation of the other variables.

The functional sector category is classified according to a modified COFOG (classification of the functions of government) classification. It is further disaggregated using a 'mode of production' classification.

In this first working paper, the OECD has gathered together data on revenues, inputs and processes. Fifty indicators in all are included in the paper (see Appendix 1). No data are included on outputs and outcomes, institutional domains outside of general government or specific sectors. This information is to be included on a phased basis. For the November 2007 working paper it is intended to include data on outputs and

outcomes, and the health and education sectors. The November 2008 working paper is intended to also cover data on antecedents or constraints that contextualise government efficiency and effectiveness, the ‘other public sector’ and ‘private sector in the public domain’ categories, and other COFOG functional categories. The first edition of *Government at a Glance* will then be produced in 2009.

Figure 2 Public sector production process



Source: OECD, 2006a

3. Presence of Irish data in *Towards Better Measurement of Government*

Before going on to look at the findings from the data available in *Towards Better Measurement of Government*, it is worth summarising the extent to which data on Ireland is available in the paper. Full details of the presence or absence of data on Ireland in the indicators used are set out in Appendix 1. There is no Irish data in the sub-national revenues section (with the exception of one of the tables in RS9 relating to borrowing constraints for sub-national governments). With regard to the other 41 indicators, data for Ireland is fully present in 33 cases, partially covered in 4 cases, and absent in 4 cases. Partially covered refers to the situation where there is more than one table or figure associated with the indicator, and data for Ireland is only available for some of these.

The reasons for the absence or partial absence of Irish data may vary. In some cases, it may be that surveys have been undertaken in a limited number of OECD countries not including Ireland. Sometimes the indicator may not be applicable in Ireland (such

as characteristics of the senior civil service). In other cases it may be a failure on the part of Irish officials to respond to a request for data. In order to maximise the potential benefits to Ireland from the *Government at a Glance* initiative, it is important that this latter category is eliminated. The Department of Finance should check the indicators used in *Towards Better Measurement of Government* and in the longer term ensure that officials respond to requests for survey data from the OECD that are associated with the *Government at a Glance* project.

It should also be noted that in the next working paper, a financial proxy output indicator will be included where inputs are classified according to functional sector (area of output) using a modified COFOG classification. Ireland will not be included in this data set, as Eurostat will supply it on an experimental basis for a small number of European countries only, and Ireland is not included in the present sample.

4. Ireland in comparative perspective: initial findings from *Towards Better Measurement of Government*

As mentioned above, the main data gathered in *Towards Better Measurement of Government* is concerned with inputs and processes.

Inputs

Overall input mix will be included in future reports, but at present there is one category of information included here: labour.

Labour

Workforce size

Two indicators examine workforce size: ‘employment in the public domain’ and ‘employment in the public domain within the total labour force’. With regard to ‘employment in the public domain’, data is available for Ireland in one of the tables: public sector total employment in fulltime equivalents (see Appendix 2, Table I2.2). Here, it can be seen that total public sector employment grew in Ireland by 29 per cent between 1990 and 2001. This rate of growth is significantly higher than in any of the other countries examined, with roughly half the countries included in the table showing a small percentage growth and half showing a decrease over similar periods.

However, when examining the indicator ‘employment in the public domain within the total labour force’ this growth is put in context. Here, the share of public employment as a percentage of the labour force is shown to have dropped slightly in Ireland from 1990, when it was 15.2 per cent to 14.1 per cent in 2000 (Appendix 2, Table I3.1). This is more in line with other countries. Some countries such as Denmark and

Finland have a notably higher percentage of the labour force in public employment (22.6 per cent and 20.8 per cent respectively in 2000). Other countries display a lower share of public employment in the labour force (for example the Netherlands at 10.5 per cent and New Zealand at 11.6 per cent).

Workforce composition

Two indicators examine workforce composition: ‘age structure of public sector employment’ and ‘participation of women in public employment’. With regard to age structure, Ireland has the lowest proportion of workers above 50 at national/federal government level in 2005 - 18 per cent - of those countries surveyed (Appendix 2, Table I4.1). Most countries have a significantly higher proportion of over 50s employed at national/federal government level. However, when changes in the proportion of workers above 50 between 1995 and 2005 are taken into account, Ireland shows a significant rise in the proportion, from 13 per cent to 18 per cent. Only in Australia and the Netherlands did the proportion of over 50s increase more rapidly (Appendix 2, Figure I4.1). Ireland is also relatively unusual in that the proportion of workers over 50 in national/federal government is lower than the proportion of workers over 50 in the total labour force in 2005 (Appendix 2, Figure I4.2). In only Ireland, Korea and Japan is this case. The Committee for Public Management Research has recently assessed the issue of the implications of ageing for the civil service (O’Riordan, 2006).

With regard to the ‘participation of women in public employment’ indicator, of the eleven countries surveyed, Ireland has a relatively low proportion of women in senior management (13 per cent in 2000) compared to most countries (Appendix 2, Table I5.2). By contrast, the proportion of women in middle management (42.5 per cent) is above that of most other countries surveyed, and the proportion of women in administrative positions (74 per cent) is the second highest after Portugal.

Compensation

Three indicators examine compensation: ‘dispersion of earnings in the public sector’, ‘public sector pension rights’ and ‘types of public sector pension schemes’. There is no data for Ireland for the dispersion of earnings indicator, which only features a small number of countries. Regarding ‘public sector pension rights’, public sector pension schemes vary substantially (Appendix 2, Table I7.1). With regard to ‘types of public sector pension schemes’, Ireland, in line with most countries surveyed, has a defined benefit scheme for the basic pension. Defined contribution schemes are more commonly found in supplementary pension schemes (Appendix 2, Table I8.1).

Processes

Five categories of data are used here: budget practices and procedures, HRM arrangements, internal and external reporting, centre of government, and management of regulatory quality.

Budget practices and procedures

Budget formulation

Four indicators cover the issue of budget formulation: ‘credibility of the economic assumptions’, ‘medium term fiscal framework’, ‘resolving disputes between ministries and the central budget authority’, and ‘role of the legislature’. The indicator on ‘credibility of the economic assumptions’ asks who is responsible for the economic assumptions used in the budget, is there independent review by a government body of the assumptions, and if the assumptions are available for scrutiny. Ireland is among the largest group of countries in having responsibility for the economic assumptions housed in the finance ministry (Appendix 2, Table P1.1). Ireland is also among the majority of countries that have no arrangements for independent review of the assumptions (Appendix 2, Table P1.2). However, in this latter case a significant number of countries do have independent review. Regarding economic assumptions being open to public scrutiny, in nearly all countries surveyed, including Ireland, the assumptions are publicly available.

The indicator on the medium term fiscal framework asks if there is a consistent medium term fiscal framework stating targets or ceilings for expenditure and how many years the framework covers (Appendix 2, Table P2.1). Ireland is in with most of the countries that do have a framework in place. The timescale of the Irish framework, three years, is in line with other countries where a three to five year period is the norm.

Regarding the ‘resolution of disputes between ministries and the central budget authority’ indicator, there are three main clusters of countries (Appendix 2, Table P3.1). The three options are: the minister of finance makes all the decisions, the issues are resolved by the head of government, and the issue is referred to cabinet. Ireland is amongst the countries where the issue is referred to cabinet. Finally in this section, the ‘role of the legislature’ indicator examines restrictions on the right of the legislature to modify the budget proposed by the executive and whether a vote on the budget is considered a vote of confidence in the government. Ireland sits with the majority of countries that have restrictions on the role of the legislature and where a vote on the budget is not considered a vote of confidence in the government (Appendix 2, Table P4.1).

Budget execution

There is only one indicator dealing with budget execution: ‘agency flexibility in budget execution’. This examines the extent to which government organisations face constraints on their ability to transfer funds between operating expenditures, investments and programme funds. Ireland is in with the majority of countries where there can be transfers, but only with the approval of the finance ministry.

Reporting, review and audit

Four indicators are used here: ‘scope and focus of audit’, ‘responsibility for programme evaluations’, ‘use of evaluations’, and ‘follow up on evaluations’. Regarding scope and focus of audit this asks if there is a central supreme or national audit office and whom it reports to. The overwhelming majority of countries, including Ireland, have a central audit office that reports to the legislature. The audit offices mostly determine subjects of audit internally (Appendix 2, Table P6.1).

With regard to evaluations the indicator on responsibility for programme evaluations asks who is responsible for conducting evaluations (a) as part of the budget process and (b) outside of the budget process (Appendix 2, Table P7.1). Regarding evaluations decided as part of the budget process, Ireland is in with a large group of countries where the department or agency in charge of the programme is responsible for conducting the evaluation. The ministry of finance is responsible in a second large cluster of countries. In the case of evaluations decided outside of the budget process, Ireland has a number of centres with responsibility for conducting evaluations including the department/agency, the ministry of finance and the national audit body. This indicator also asks whether evaluations are commissioned on a systematic or ad hoc basis across a range of activities. Ireland is one of only two countries, along with Poland, that claims to take a systematic approach to evaluation across the board (Appendix 2, Table P7.2).

With regard to use of evaluations, the indicator asks where and how often evaluations are used in the budget process and if the findings of evaluations are used by spending ministries/departments in negotiations with the ministry of finance. In Ireland, as in the majority of countries, evaluations are rarely used in the budget formulation process in the ministry of finance. It is stated, however, that they are often used in the budget formulation process at ministerial/departmental level (Appendix 2, Table P8.1). It is also reported that the findings of evaluations are often used by spending departments in Ireland in negotiations with the ministry of finance (Appendix 2, Table P8.2). Finally regarding follow-up of evaluations, the indicator asks about the extent

and type of follow-up of evaluations. Ireland, in line with most countries, has a follow up process in place for some evaluations. Ireland is also in a group of approximately half the countries surveyed that have a role for the national audit body in reviewing the evaluation process and in auditing some individual evaluations (Appendix 2, Table P9.1).

HRM arrangements

System overview

Two indicators cover the issue of system overview: ‘characteristics of the general HRM arrangements’ and ‘characteristics of the senior civil service’. The ‘characteristics of the general HRM arrangements’ indicator examines the extent to which countries use a career-based or position-based system. Ireland emphasises a career-based system. Ireland is in with a group of countries (including France, Greece, Hungary, Japan) that in recruitment put the emphasis on competitive examination and education. Another larger group of countries (including Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland) put the emphasis on competition for posts and professional experience (Appendix 2, Table P10.1). With regard to the openness of government posts, Ireland is one of only two countries, along with France, with the most restrictions on openness of government posts for competition (Appendix 2, Table P10.2). However, it should be noted that the data for this table is from a 2004 survey, and pre-dates more recent developments. The OECD interestingly note that the more ‘whole of government’ focus of position based systems, aimed at encouraging mobility across government, may be reducing as “(a) salary broad-banding means that pay can be increased by merit-based increases within the same position – so less reason to move (b) increasing focus on technically specialist positions (many other having been contracted out) and so narrower job criteria are making it harder to obtain positions in other departments”.

Ireland is not represented in the ‘characteristics of the senior civil service’ indicator. The OECD point out that there are signs of more career-based approaches within the senior civil services of otherwise strongly position-based systems. In most OECD countries with a senior civil service, there are two-three levels within the senior civil service and there are no restrictions on openness for external recruitment.

Pay policy

Two indicators address pay policy issues: ‘institutional frameworks for pay determination’ and ‘prevalence of performance-related pay’. Regarding the ‘institutional frameworks for pay determination’ indicator, the table on collective bargaining types (Appendix 2, Table P12.1) shows Ireland down twice, under both the

no pay bargaining and single collective bargaining columns. Regarding participation of unions in decision-making on pay, Ireland is in with the largest group of countries that state that union participation is ‘relatively strong’ (Appendix 2, Table P12.2).

With regard to the prevalence of performance-related pay, Ireland is one of only two countries surveyed (along with Norway) that has performance-related pay for senior staff only. Most countries with performance-related pay have it for most government employees. Around half the countries who have performance-related pay (including Ireland) mostly use one-off bonuses. The other half mostly uses merit increments (Appendix 2, Table P13.1).

Ethics infrastructure and oversight

There are four indicators under the ethics infrastructure and oversight heading: ‘ethics infrastructure’, ‘scope of the conflict of interest policy’, ‘enforcing of the conflict of interest policy’, and ‘conflict of interest policies for post-public employment’. Regarding the ‘ethics infrastructure’ indicator, this lists the core values stated in public documents. Ireland shares many of the stated core values with other OECD countries (Appendix 2, Table P14.1). The most frequently stated core value not explicitly stated in Ireland’s public documents is integrity (this is based on an OECD survey carried out in 2000). The OECD note a trend to introduce new values in line with recent public management reforms, such as service-mindedness (Australia, Finland), achieving results (Australia) and earning of citizens’ satisfaction (Hungary).

The indicators on ‘scope of the conflict of interest policy’, ‘enforcing of the conflict of interest policy’, and ‘conflict of interest policies for post-public employment’ all deal with aspects of the handling of potential conflicts of interest affecting officials (Appendix 2, Tables P15.1, P16.1, P17.1). There are broad similarities in approach across many OECD countries.

Internal and external reporting

Open government

Only one indicator is used here: ‘open government legislation’. This indicator shows the legislative scope of open government legislation. Most countries have similar scope, with the OECD noting that legislation has increased significantly in this area in the past 20 years. Ireland is somewhat unusual in not having laws on administrative procedures: providing some guarantees for citizens in their interactions with government and establishing mechanisms for holding administrative powers accountable (Appendix 2, Table P18.1).

E-government readiness

Three indicators are used to assess e-government readiness: ‘legal framework for e-government service provision’, ‘e-government infrastructure’, and ‘e-government benefits evaluation methodology’. The legal framework indicator shows the major laws regulating electronic data and services. Ireland is covered by EU directives (Appendix 2, Table P19.1). The ‘e-government infrastructure’ indicator relates to interconnectivity and interoperability issues. Ireland is among a relatively small group of countries that state that there is a common information architecture or that a standardisation board exists (Appendix 2, Table P20.1). Data for Ireland is not present for the indicator on ‘e-government benefits evaluation methodology’. The OECD note that *ex ante* business case information is mandated by many governments, but it is less common to verify, *ex post*, whether or not the expected benefits have been achieved.

Performance measurement arrangements

Three indicators are used here: ‘types of performance measure used’, ‘roles and responsibilities in performance management systems’, and ‘use of performance measures in the budget process’. With regard to the ‘types of performance measure used’ indicator, Ireland is in a group of just under one third of countries that report they have all types of performance measure specified (performance measures, evaluations and benchmarking) and assess all specified aspects of performance (efficiency, economy, quality and effectiveness) (Appendix 2, Table P22.1). In terms of the types of performance measure developed, Ireland reports that unit cost of outputs is the measure developed. Most countries surveyed report this measure, and that they measure a combination of outputs and outcomes (Appendix 2, Table P22.2).

The ‘roles and responsibilities in performance management system’ indicator examines where institutional responsibility lies for the development of performance measurement. Ireland identifies specific roles for the ministry of finance, the department/agency, the evaluation unit in each department and the national audit body. Ireland does not, however, report the most common responsibility for ministries of finance – providing horizontal support for developing performance measures (Appendix 2, Table P23.1). Also, about half OECD countries have a formal role for the legislature in performance management, which Ireland does not report as having. The survey data on which this indicator is based pre-dates the budget statement on the introduction of annual output statements (Appendix 2, Table P23.2).

Regarding the ‘use of performance measures in the budget process’ indicator, Ireland is aligned with the majority of countries that report their ministry of finance rarely

eliminates programmes when the results show poor performance (Appendix 2, Table P24.1). The OECD report that when programmes show poor performance, the most common course of action is that resources are held constant and the programme is reviewed during the course of the year.

Centre of government

Government offices

Two indicators are put forward here: 'structure of government offices' and 'communication by government offices'. The 'structure of government offices' indicator examines the functions of the government office – a generic term referring to the administrative body that serves the head of government and the cabinet, and the prime minister's office – the office that specifically serves the head of the government. In all but one country (Portugal) the staff of the government office are civil servants. Similarly in most countries the staff of the prime minister's office are civil servants. In approximately half the countries surveyed, however, the head of the government office is a political appointee (Appendix 2, Table P25.1). This indicator also examines if there is a strategic planning unit and if so where it is located (Appendix 2, Table P25.2). Further, the indicator examines if civil servants in the government office are normally seconded from other departments. Ireland is in with a group of about half the countries surveyed which reports that no employees are seconded (Appendix 2, Table P25.3).

The second indicator under this heading examines communication by government offices. Ireland is in with the majority of countries that have a communications unit, located in the prime minister's office (Appendix 2, Table P26.1).

Management of regulatory quality

Institutional setting to promote quality in regulatory management systems

This indicator examines the functions of the body in charge of regulatory oversight. Ireland is with the majority of countries where the functions include being consulted on new regulations, reviewing regulatory impact studies conducted by departments, conducting its own regulatory impact analysis, and performing an advocacy role regarding regulatory quality and reform. Ireland is also one of approximately half of the countries reporting that the central body does not require reports on progress made on reform by individual departments (Appendix 2, Table P27.1).

Rule making procedures

This indicator examines the extent of forward planning as a means to inform citizens and businesses of current and future regulatory developments. Ireland is with the

majority of countries where consultation on new regulations is undertaken on a structured basis and where there is forward planning of primary laws. Just over one third of countries (not including Ireland) have forward planning procedures in place for subordinate regulations (Appendix 2, Table P28.1).

Consultations and participation from the public

Here, the forms of public consultation and openness of the consultation process are examined. With regard to the forms of consultation, Ireland displays the full range of consultation methods employed by OECD countries for laws (Appendix 2, Table P29.1). Regarding openness of the consultation process, Ireland reports having views expressed in the consultation process included in the regulatory impact analysis (Appendix 2, Table P29.2).

Use of regulatory tools and processes

Regulatory impact analysis is reported as carried out in all OECD countries. Nearly all countries (including Ireland) report carrying out assessment of regulatory alternatives, consultation with affected parties and plain language drafting requirements. Ireland is in the majority of countries that report carrying out sector based systematic evaluation of regulatory programmes, but not government wide evaluations (Appendix 2, Table P30.1).

Dimensions considered in regulatory impact analysis

This indicator assesses the specific impacts commonly measured in regulatory impact analysis. Ireland is in line with practice in most countries, except in not requiring impact on the public sector to be included (Appendix 2, Table P31.1).

Reducing administrative burdens

In this indicator, the extent to which administrative simplification is practiced by emphasising cutting red tape and the measurement of the aggregated burden of regulations is examined. No data is available for Ireland on this indicator.

5. OECD technical papers issued with *Towards Better Measurement of Government*

At the same time as the OECD issued *Towards Better Measurement of Government*, it released three technical papers dealing with issues associated with the project:

- Technical Paper 1 *How and Why Should Government Activity be Measured in Government at a Glance* (OECD, 2006b) reviews the project's strategy and provides details on its scope, classification and other technical points.

- Technical Paper 2 *Issues in Output Measurement for Government at a Glance* (OECD, 2006c) contains a discussion of issues regarding the measurement of non-financial outputs in the public sector.
- Technical Paper 3 *Issues in Outcome Measurement for Government at a Glance* (OECD, 2006d) suggests that a series of executive governance outcomes are developed, primarily related to the activities of the executive branch of government.

These technical papers can be downloaded from the OECD website dedicated to the project: <http://www.oecd.org/gov/indicators>. Technical Paper 1 essentially sets out the intended scope of the *Government at a Glance* project and the reasons for undertaking the project. Of particular interest are Technical Papers 2 and 3, and these are summarized below.

Technical Paper 2: Issues in Output Measurement for Government at a Glance

This technical paper refers to output measures as measures that capture the volume, quality and value of government goods and services. The paper also notes that the OECD intends to include intermediate outcome measures in their definition of outputs. In examining how output measures are used, the paper draws a distinction between the use of output measures for planning and for control/accountability. The paper also draws a distinction between two different ways in which output measures are connected to decisions:

- *Tight* measurement, where decisions are clearly mainly driven by the measurement.
- *Loose* measurement, where decisions are informed by output measures, but other sources of information influence the decision.

In practice, the paper notes that in both planning and control/accountability contexts, output measures are normally loosely connected to decisions.

In terms of how output measures are designed, the paper notes a number of features. One is the distinction between output measures that capture transactions, and those that reflect the provision of services. In the transactions approach, output is counted when the transaction is complete e.g. number of pupils, prisoners, fires attended. In the provision approach, outputs are seen as the products or services that come out of the production process, regardless of whether or not they are consumed e.g. number of teaching hours, number of cells, number of call outs to the fire brigade. The paper

also examines the gaming that can be associated with output measures, and suggests way such gaming can be mitigated. Some of the interactions between these issues examined are illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1: Tradeoffs between the basis and use of output measures

Type of decision-making	
A. Planning	B. Accountability and control
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Technically and politically difficult to make a tight connection between output measures and planning – and tight connections create stronger incentives for gaming. ▪ Loose connection more plausible, but the impact of output measures can be diluted. ▪ Transaction (consumption) approach is more promising as the basis for output measures used for planning. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Tight connection with output measures produces a strong enforcement effect – but this can be undermined by the incentives that this provides for gaming. ▪ When used more loosely as the basis for discussions, output measures have a weaker enforcement effect – but gaming can be mitigated. ▪ Provision approach is more promising as the basis for output measures used for accountability and control, but this begs the question as to the effectiveness of the output.

Source: OECD (2006c)

Technical Paper 3: Issues in Outcome Measurement for Government at a Glance

This paper reviews the outcome measures that governments use and in particular examines the growth in ‘suites’ of ‘well-being’ outcome measures, such as *Measuring Ireland’s Progress*. Such suites of measures usually include key education, health, environment, economic and other indicators covering issues such as educational attainment, life expectancy at birth, air quality and so on.

The paper notes that measures of ‘executive governance’ outcomes are not included in many sets of well-being measures. Accordingly, the paper concludes that *Government at a Glance* could contribute by developing outcome measures covering executive governance. Three types of executive governance outcome measures are proposed: public confidence, equity and fiscal/economic stability. Public confidence could encompass issues around trust in government and associated concerns about the predictability and acceptability of government policy. Equity could include the measured distribution of services and benefits across diverse populations. Fiscal/economic stability could focus on the track record of the government in this area.

6. Conclusions

OECD Working Paper No. 1, *Towards Better Measurement of Government*, is a first step in a multi-year process. The intention is to produce the first *Government at a Glance* publication in 2009. As a first step it is, therefore, only partial in its coverage and subject to the limitations that an initial attempt to produce new information will face. Nevertheless, it represents an important initiative in the attempt to provide international comparative data on government and public services.

A number of general points relating to limitations of the data are worth highlighting, in terms of improvements that might be made as the process continues:

- The timeliness of some of the data can lead to problems for interpretation. The data in some cases goes back to 2000. There have been significant changes in Ireland in several of the indicators produced, and no doubt the same is true of many other countries.
- A significant number of the process indicators rely on self-reporting by member states in response to survey questions. At times, this self-reporting is open to interpretation and a different answer could be given depending on who is providing the return.
- It could be helpful with regard to the measurement of processes if information could be developed around some of the outputs and outcomes associated with the processes. For example, in relation to regulatory reform the number of regulatory impact statements carried out in a year rather than just whether RIA is carried out or not. With regard to recruitment, the percentage of posts filled from outside the civil service rather than just whether posts are open to competition or not.
- Each OECD indicator is accompanied by some introductory text (not included in the appendix here for space reasons). On occasion, this introductory text contains information not included in the tables and figures. For example, the number of staff employed in central regulatory units in some countries is discussed in the text for indicator P27 (institutional setting to promote quality in regulatory management systems) but is not contained in any of the associated tables or figures. Consistency of presentation is needed.

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Appendix 1
OECD Public Management data sets – presence or absence of Irish data

Revenues	Irish data present
3 Revenue structure	
RS1. Revenues structure of sub-central governments	X
4 Tax autonomy	
RS2. Tax autonomy of sub-central governments	X
RS3. Evolution of tax autonomy of sub-central governments	X
RS4. Tax autonomy of sub-central governments by type of tax	X
5 Grants	
RS5. Grants by donor and recipient	X
RS6. Grant revenue by type of grant	X
RS7. Intergovernmental grants by government function	X
6 Fiscal rules	
RS8. Budget balance requirements for sub-central governments	X
RS9. Borrowing constraints for sub-central governments	*
RS10. Tax and expenditure limits for sub-central governments	X
RS11. Process rules and rule implementation requirements for sub-central governments	X

Inputs

Overall input mix	
I1. Mode of public sector production (not included now until 2007 working paper)	X
7 Labour	
<i>Workforce size</i>	
I2. Employment in public domain	*
I3. Employment in the public domain within the total labour force	√
<i>Workforce composition</i>	
I4. Age structure of public sector employment	*
I5. Participation of women in public employment	*
<i>Compensation</i>	
I6. Dispersion of earnings in the public sector	X
I7. Public sector pension rights	√
I8. Types of public sector pension schemes	√

Processes

8 Budget practices and procedures	
<i>Budget formulation</i>	
P1. Credibility of the economic assumptions	√
P2. Medium term fiscal framework	√
P3. Resolving disputes between ministries and the central budget authority	√
P4. Role of the legislature	√
<i>Budget execution</i>	
P5. Agency flexibility in budget execution	√
<i>Reporting, review and audit</i>	
P6. Scope and focus of audit	√
P7. Responsibility for programme evaluations	√
P8. Use of evaluations	√
P9. follow-up on evaluations	√
9 HRM arrangements	
<i>System overview</i>	
P10. Characteristics of the general HRM arrangements	*
P11. Characteristics of the senior civil service	X
<i>Pay policy</i>	
P12. Institutional frameworks for pay determination	√
P13. Prevalence of performance-related pay	√
<i>Ethical infrastructure and oversight</i>	
P14. Ethics infrastructure	√
P15. Scope of the conflict of interest policy	√
P16. Enforcing the conflict of interest policy	√
P17. Conflict of interest policies for post-public employment	√
10 Internal and external reporting	
<i>Open government</i>	
P18. Open government legislation	√
<i>E-government readiness</i>	
P19. Legal framework for e-government service provision	√
P20. E-government infrastructure	√
P21. E-government benefits evaluation methodology	X
<i>Performance measurement arrangements</i>	
P22. Types of performance measure used	√
P23. Roles and responsibilities in performance management systems	√
P24. Use of performance measures in the budget process	√
11 Centre of government	
<i>Government offices</i>	
P25. Structure of government offices	√
P26. Communication by government offices	√

12 Management of regulatory quality	
P27. Institutional setting to promote quality in regulatory management systems	√
P28. Rule making procedures	√
P29. Consultations and participation from the public	√
P30. Use of regulatory tools and processes	√
P31. Dimensions considered in regulatory impact analysis	√
P32. Reducing administrative burdens rule making procedures	X

Appendix 2

Table I2.2. Public Sector Total Employment in Full Time Equivalent

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
Austria													1990-2000
Federal Administration	163900	163337	166691	169891	171822	169892	171579	171167	170876	169003	165093	161558	1%
Landers	143036	145473	146009	148244	150034	149538	143170	131393	132411	132857	132644		-7%
Local Administration	130996	134772	141155	142747	145102	147316	150092	140442	140355	139700	140527		7%
<i>Total Public Sector</i>	<i>437932</i>	<i>443581</i>	<i>453856</i>	<i>460883</i>	<i>466958</i>	<i>466746</i>	<i>464841</i>	<i>443002</i>	<i>443642</i>	<i>441560</i>	<i>438264</i>		<i>0.1%</i>
Belgium													1992-2000
Federal Administration			76154.1	76004.2	75694	75998	73729	73189	73085	73349	76439		0.4%
Czech Republic¹													1997-1999
Central Administration								471861	460592	432757			-8%
Local Administration								223588	223855	240681			8%
France													1997-1999
Central Administration								2362400	2381830	2395159	2423577		1%
Regional Administration								963220	973952	998599			4%
Local Administration								927637	942787	951176			3%
<i>Total Public Sector</i>								<i>4253257</i>	<i>4298569</i>	<i>4344934</i>			<i>2%</i>
Hungary													1997-2001
Central Administration								274098	280802	280707	274299	271759	-1%
Local Administration								516743	523680	503216	501947	500743	-3%

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
<i>Total Public Sector</i>								790841	804482	783923	776246	772502	-2%
Ireland													1990-2001
Central Administration	28090	28889	29519	29654	30155	31282	31030	30856	31562	32733	34068	36092	28%
Regional Administration	146696	148764	151563	154055	158642	160942	161450	164713	167901	175193	183605	193851	32%
Local Administration	26681	26715	26793	27060	26540	26479	26500	26500	26900	27400	28800	29300	10%
<i>Total Public Sector</i>	<i>201467</i>	<i>204366</i>	<i>207875</i>	<i>210769</i>	<i>215337</i>	<i>218703</i>	<i>218980</i>	<i>222069</i>	<i>226363</i>	<i>235326</i>	<i>246473</i>	<i>259243</i>	<i>29%</i>
Korea													1990-2001
Central Administration	553746	567385	579884	583411	582570	574117	576637	578557	572948	565619	563682	566091	2%
Regional Administration	264375	286697	306295	316415	325028	331273	349157	357202	315386	310053	64802	64906	-75%
Local Administration											241192	237123	
<i>Total Public Sector</i>	<i>818121</i>	<i>854082</i>	<i>886179</i>	<i>899826</i>	<i>907598</i>	<i>905390</i>	<i>925794</i>	<i>935759</i>	<i>888334</i>	<i>875672</i>	<i>869676</i>	<i>868120</i>	<i>6%</i>
Netherlands													1996-2000
Central Administration							491287	499525	516839	523697	537072		9%
Provinces							35623	34174	34313	34309	34473		-3%
Local Administration							154268	151793	154100	155764	156304		1%
<i>Total Public Sector</i>							<i>681178</i>	<i>685492</i>	<i>705252</i>	<i>713770</i>	<i>727849</i>		<i>7%</i>
New Zealand													1991-2001
Central Administration		183700	178310	179640	180810	175260	178380	171830	174090	178440	171640	177940	-3%
Regional Administration		27160	21770	21070	21260	20580	20290	18840	18700	18480	18990	18700	-31%

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
<i>Total Public Sector</i>		210860	200080	200710	202070	195840	198670	190670	192790	196920	190630	196640	-7%
Norway													1999-2000
<i>Total Public Sector</i>										111694	111046		-1%
Poland													1994-2000
Central Administration					133330	141494	156856	163487	171246	147835	135865		2%
Regional Administration										25786	45953		
Local Administration					135022	139295	133369	142114	138227	132769	133518		-1%
<i>Total Public Sector</i>					2082979	2107264	2118433	2142042	2169111	2186769	2151044		3%
Sweden													1995-2001
Central Administration						228000	224000	220000	217000	217000	211000	204000	-11%

¹ Excluding permanent Ddefence Forces and Police

Source: OECD Public Management Service, 2002. Copyright OECD 2002. All rights reserved. These data are being updated in the 2006 OECD CEPD survey.

Table I3.1: Share of Public Employment over the Labour Force (%)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Australia¹	20.8	20.5	19.9	19.6	18.3	17.9	17.5	16.4	15.9	15.6	15.2	15.2
Austria²	12.4	12.3	12.3	12.3	12.1	12.0	12.0	11.4	11.4	11.3	11.2	
Canada³	18.7	18.9	19.0	18.7	18.3	18.0	17.3	16.7	16.3	16.0	15.8	15.7
Czech Republic⁴								14.4	14.2	13.9		
Denmark³								22.6	22.8	22.6	22.6	23.1
Finland²	22.4	22.7	22.3	21.3	21.4	20.9	21.3	21.8	21.6	21.0	20.8	20.8
France								18.1	18.3	18.3		
Germany		13.3	13.2	12.8	12.5	12.2	11.9	11.6	11.3	11.0	10.7	
Greece								6.4	6.1			
Hungary								20.4	20.5	19.5	19.2	19.3
Ireland	15.2	15.2	15.3	15.1	15.1	15.0	14.6	14.4	14.0	13.9	14.1	
Italy								13.4	13.5	13.2		
Luxembourg	8.8	8.8	8.7	7.5	7.4	7.3	7.2	7.5	7.1	7.0	6.9	6.7
Netherlands							10.4	10.5	10.5	10.4	10.5	
New Zealand		14.6	13.8	13.7	13.5	12.6	12.4	11.8	11.9	12.2	11.6	11.8
Norway										5.7	5.7	
Poland					12.2	12.3	12.4	12.5	12.6	12.8	12.4	
Spain	11.8	11.4	11.4	11.6	11.6	11.8	11.9	11.9	12.0	12.1	11.2	12.0
Turkey								8.9	8.8	9.1	10.0	
United States	14.1	14.1	14.1	14.1	14.1	14.0	14.0	13.8	13.9	13.9	14.1	

Source: Labour Force: OECD Labour Force Statistics, 2002.


¹ Public Employment excludes Permanent Defence Forces² Public Employment Data in Full Time Equivalent³ Public Employment excludes Government Business Enterprises⁴ Public Employment excludes Permanent Defence Forces and Police

Table I4.1 Proportion of workers above 50, at national/federal government level, in 2005

	National /federal government	Total labour force
Australia	24%	24%
Austria	24%	19%
Belgium	44%	20%
Finland	33%	29%
France	31%	24%
Hungary	36%	24%
Ireland	18%	21%
Japan	25%	33%
Korea	19%	22%
Luxembourg	24%	19%
Mexico	24%	20%
Netherlands	27%	23%
Norway	35%	28%
Portugal	24%	23%
Sweden	40%	31%
Switzerland	32%	27%
UK	28%	26%
USA	37%	27%

Source: OECD (2006), Report on ageing in the civil service, Paris.

Figure I4.1. Proportion of workers above 50, at national/federal government level, in 1995 and in 2005



Note: For the figures I4.1 to I4.2, employees at national/federal government levels include:

Australia: Ongoing employees only – around 123000 persons in 2005

Austria: Federal administration

Belgium: Around 85000 persons of the core federal civil service

Finland: Central government sector

France: State civil service

Hungary: National and sub-national levels

Ireland: Around 30000 employees of the core civil service

Korea: Core ministries. I.e. Ministries, Agencies, Administrations belonging to the central administrative organisations (the Executive)

Norway: The 117000 employees of the federal level (in 2005)

Switzerland: Federal administration (departments, offices)

USA: 1.8 millions employees at the federal level

Employees at the sub-national levels include:

Australia: State, Territory and Local (all employees)

Finland: Total public sector


Hungary: National and sub-national levels

Netherlands: Figures contain the subsectors for which labour conditions are not determined at national Government level. These subsectors are: municipalities and their bodies of cooperation, provinces, waterboards, professional education, adult education, scientific education

Portugal: Local administration, excluding the regional administrations of Madeira and Azores

Source: OECD (2006), Report on ageing in the civil service, Paris.

Figure 14.2. Proportion of workers about 50 at the national/federal government, proportion of persons above 50 in the total labour force, 2005



Source: OECD (2006), Report on ageing in the civil service, Paris.

Table I5.2. Proportion of women in management group, at the national level, 2005

	Senior Managers	Middle managers	Administrative managers
Finland	76	70	55
Mexico	35	50.02	45.54
Portugal	34	52	83
United Kingdom	29	49.7	61.9
Norway	23	35	...
Netherlands	14	19.9	34.5
Ireland*	13	42.5	74
Belgium	13	36.9	54.9
Switzerland	9	21.2	...
Korea	3	9.1	24.3
Japan	2	12.2	28.6

Note: *Data for 2000

Sources: Preliminary sample results from the Survey on Strategic human resource in government. Complete analysis will be published in the OECD (2007), State of the Public Service. Paris (forthcoming).

Table I7.1 Minimum age and rules for determining the pensions of public sector employees in OECD

	Minimum age (years)	Pay-in period	Maximum replacement rate (%)	Basis for calculation Indexation method
Australia Basic scheme	55 under PSS (<i>Public Sector Superannuation Scheme</i>) Can opt to work until 75		1/3 of Salary	Final salary (basis for contributions)
Austria Basic scheme	60 65 by 2017 Maximum age: 70	40 – 45 15 minimum	80	12 best months in 2003 24 best months in 2004 36 best months in 2005 (for <i>Beamte</i>) 186 best months rising to 480 by 2028 (for <i>Vertragsbedienstete</i>) Indexed to salaries only
Belgium Basic scheme	65, with early retirement option from age 60 except if physically disabled Maximum age: 70	5 minimum	75 maximum	Average pay (base salary + bonuses and miscellaneous benefits) over the past 5 years or, if less than 5 years' service: entire career; for military personnel, final salary Indexation: prices plus equalisation.
Czech Republic Basic scheme	63 for men and between 59 and 62 for women who have not had children (average retirement age: 57 for women and 61 for men).	5 in 95 30 by 2016	44% of average gross pay; 57% of net. Rate has dropped from 61% in 1998 to 57 in 2004	Universal scheme + defined benefits (standard pension + amount based on a percentage of salary) Indexed to salaries Adjustment: rise in cost of living and 1/3 rd of increase in real salaries
Denmark Basic scheme	60 Maximum: 70	37 maxi 10 mini	Depends on grade From 40 to 70 (average: 57)	Final salary + number of years' service. Flat rate + ATP
Finland Basic scheme	65 (early retirement special)	40	60	Average salary over the 10 last years
France Basic scheme	60 (option from 55) Maximum: 70	37.5	75	Pay index of the final 6 months
Germany Basic scheme	65 except for certain civil servants (police, armed forces: 61) Average age: 60.3 Can retire early from age 63 – raised by 1 month per year from 2011 to age 67 in 2035 – with penalties.	40	75	Final salary (including bonuses and allowances)
Greece (1993 reform) Basic scheme	65	35	60 Before reform: 80%	Salaries of the final 5 years excluding bonuses/number of months' contributions for

	Minimum age (years)	Pay-in period	Maximum replacement rate (%)	Basis for calculation Indexation method
				service after 2007 Before then, final salary
Hungary	For men: being raised to 62 by 1 additional year every 2 years Maximum: 70 For women: being raised to 62 by 1 additional year every 2 years until 2009	36/37 20 minimum	60	All activity Calculation aggregates age and length of service. Maximum age: 70
Ireland Basic scheme	60 Maximum: 65	40	50	Final 12 months (including certain supplemental remuneration)
Japan Basic scheme	65 Persons born prior to 1 April 1961 may retire early between 60 and 64	25	69.2%	Salary + bonus, including non-monetary compensation
Netherlands Mandatory supplemental scheme	65	40 (if less than 40 years)	70 55%	Final annual salary received
New Zealand	65			
Norway Basic scheme	67 (no differentiation between men and women)	30	66 (FDP included)	20 best years; for early retirement, pension reduced by 1/30 th per year. Indexation on previous years' salaries; in the future should be based on average pay.
Poland	60 for women 65 for men	40	No minimum period (notional accounts system)	
Portugal (Pre-reform) Basic scheme	60 Maximum: 70	36	100%	Final salary prior to August 2005 reform
Slovenia Basic scheme	63 for men 61 for women No age difference in respect of early retirement (58 for both sexes) Possible from age 55	10 15		Depends on period of contributions
Spain Basic scheme	65 Early retirement option from 60 Maximum: 70	35	100	Reference salaries set annually by the Ministry of Finance
Sweden Compulsory supplemental scheme	61 Normal age: 65	30	10% (Supplemental scheme only)	Average pay over the final 5 years (capped) including all forms of remuneration other than benefits in kind
United Kingdom	65 (Early retirement)	40	50	Best salary over the final 3 years

	Minimum age (years)	Pay-in period	Maximum replacement rate (%)	Basis for calculation Indexation method
Supplemental scheme can be substituted for SERPS	option from age 60 Maximum: 70			
United States	65			Average salary over the best 35 years, then pension computed using a rate that decreases with level of earned income, with three set brackets: 90%; 32% and 15%.

Sources: The information provided is based on the findings of a survey on pension schemes for public sector workers in OECD Member countries.

Table 18.1 Types of pension schemes for public sector employees in selected OECD Member countries

	Basic pension	Supplemental pension
Australia	DB (PSS)	DC
Austria	DB	DC for contract workers
Belgium	DB	...
Czech Republic	DB+PAYG	DC
Denmark	DB	...
Finland	DB	...
France	DB	DC
Germany	DB or DC	DB or DC
Greece	DB	...
Hungary	DB	DC
Ireland	DB	...
Japan	DB	...
Luxembourg	DB	...
Netherlands	DB	...
New Zealand	DB	DC
Norway	DB	DB
Poland	DB	DC
Portugal	DB	DC
Slovenia	DB	DC
Spain	DB	...
Sweden	DB	...
United Kingdom	...	DC

Note: DB – defined benefit scheme, DC – defined contribution plans

Source: The information provided is based on the findings of a survey on pension schemes for public sector workers in OECD Member countries.

Table P1.1 Who is responsible for the economic assumptions used in the budget?

	Central Budget Authority or Budget Division of Finance Ministry (Treasury)	A different part of Finance Ministry (Treasury)	Economics Ministry	Independent Body	Legislature or other legislative body	Other
Australia	■					
Austria				■		
Belgium				■		■
Canada	■					
Czech Republic		■				
Denmark	■					
Finland		■				
France						
Germany			■			
Greece			■			
Hungary		■				
Iceland		■				
Ireland	■					
Italy		■				
Japan			■			
Korea						■
Mexico		■				
Netherlands				■		
New Zealand		■				
Norway		■				
Portugal						■
Slovak Republic		■				
Spain			■			
Sweden		■				
Turkey						■
United Kingdom	■					
United States						■
Algeria	■					
Argentina			■			
Bolivia						■
Cambodia	■					
Chile	■					
Colombia		■				
Indonesia	■					
Israel		■				
Jordan						■
Kenya			■			■
Morocco	■					
Slovenia				■		
South Africa		■				
Suriname	■					■
Uruguay			■			

Source: The information is from the 2003 survey conducted for the OECD/World Bank Budget Practices and Procedures Database (<http://ocde.dyndns.org/>)

Table P1.2. Credibility of economic assumptions

Is there any independent review by a government body of the economic assumptions used in the budget?					Are economic assumptions available for scrutiny?				
	Yes, independent panel or similar, it is a legal requirement	Yes, independent panel or similar, it is not a legal requirement	Yes, audit office, it is a legal requirement	Yes, audit office, it is not a legal requirement	No	Yes, they are explicitly available to the Public and the Legislature as part of the budget documentation	Yes, they are explicitly available to the Public and the Legislature but is presented at different time than the budget documentation	Yes, they are available only to the Legislature	No
Australia			■		■	■			
Austria						■			
Belgium					■	■			
Canada		■				■			
Czech Republic		■				■			
Denmark					■	■			
Finland					■	■			
France	■					■			
Germany		■				■			
Greece					■				■
Hungary		■				■			
Iceland					■	■			
Ireland					■	■			
Italy					■		■		
Japan					■		■		
Korea		■				■			
Mexico					■	■			
Netherlands		■					■		
New Zealand					■	■			
Norway					■	■			
Portugal					■	■			
Slovak	■					■			

	Yes, independent panel or similar, it is a legal requirement	Yes, independent panel or similar, it is not a legal requirement	Yes, audit office, it is a legal requirement	Yes, audit office, it is not a legal requirement	No	Yes, they are explicitly available to the Public and the Legislature as part of the budget documentation	Yes, they are explicitly available to the Public and the Legislature but is presented at different time than the budget documentation	Yes, they are available only to the Legislature	No
Republic Spain					■	■			
Sweden					■	■			
Turkey					■	■			
United Kingdom			■			■			
United States	■					■			
Algeria		■				■			
Argentina					■	■			
Bolivia		■				■			
Cambodia			■			■			
Chile					■	■			
Colombia					■				■
Indonesia		■				■			
Israel					■	■			
Jordan					■	■			
Kenya					■	■			
Morocco		■				■			
Slovenia		■				■			
South Africa					■	■			
Suriname					■		■		
Uruguay					■			■	

Source: The information is from the 2003 survey conducted for the OECD/World Bank Budget Practices and Procedures Database (<http://ocde.dyndns.org/>)

Table P2.1. Medium term fiscal framework

Is there a consistent medium-term fiscal framework stating targets or ceilings for expenditures?					How many budget years does the medium-term fiscal framework cover?
	Yes	Yes, but it states only targets/ceilings for the medium term, not for each subsequent budget year within that term	No, there is no such framework	Other, please specify	
Australia				■	4 years
Austria	■				4 years
Belgium	■				3 years
Canada	■				5 years
Czech Republic			■		3 years
Denmark		■			Other
Finland	■				4 years
France				■	3 years
Germany	■				3 years
Greece	■				4 years
Hungary					3 years
Iceland				■	4 years
Ireland	■				3 years
Italy	■				3 years
Japan				■	5 years
Korea	■				3 years
Mexico		■			5 years
Netherlands	■				5 years
New Zealand	■				2 years
Norway				■	Other
Portugal	■				4 years
Slovak Republic	■				5 years
Spain	■				3 years
Sweden	■				3 years
Turkey			■		...
United Kingdom	■				5 years
United States			■		...
Algeria					...
Argentina	■				3 years
Bolivia		■			Other
Cambodia		■			5 years
Chile				■	3 years
Colombia			■		...
Indonesia			■		2 years
Israel	■				Other
Jordan		■			3 years
Kenya		■			3 years
Morocco		■			5 years
Slovenia	■				4 years
South Africa	■				3 years
Suriname				■	Other
Uruguay	■				5 years

Source: The information is from the 2003 survey conducted for the OECD/World Bank Budget Practices and Procedures Database (<http://ocde.dyndns.org/>)

Table P3.1. How are disputes between Ministries and the central budget authority typically resolved?

	The minister of finance makes all final decisions	The issues are resolved by the President/Prime Minister/Principal Executive	Cabinet	The issues are sent to a ministerial committee	Other
Australia			■		
Austria			■		
Belgium			■		
Canada		■			
Czech Republic			■		
Denmark				■	
Finland			■		
France		■			
Germany			■		
Greece					
Hungary			■		
Iceland	■				
Ireland			■		
Italy		■			
Japan
Korea		■			
Mexico		■			
Netherlands			■		
New Zealand			■		
Norway			■		
Portugal					■
Slovak Republic			■		
Spain		■			
Sweden		■			
Turkey		■			
United Kingdom	■				
United States		■			
Algeria					
Argentina		■			
Bolivia					■
Cambodia	■				
Chile		■			
Colombia	■				
Indonesia		■			
Israel		■			
Jordan	■				
Kenya	■				
Morocco		■			
Slovenia		■			
South Africa				■	
Suriname		■			
Uruguay	■				

Source: The information is from the 2003 survey conducted for the OECD/World Bank Budget Practices and Procedures Databases (<http://ocde.dyndns.org/>)

Table P4.1. Role of the legislature

	Are there any restrictions on the right of the legislature to modify the detailed budget proposed by the executive	Notwithstanding any legal restriction on the legislator's ability to modify the budget, is a vote on the budget considered a vote of confidence in the government, i.e. the government would resign if any changes are approved to its budget proposal?
Australia	■	
Austria		
Belgium		■
Canada	■	■
Czech Republic		
Denmark		■
Finland		
France	■	
Germany		
Greece	■	■
Hungary		
Iceland		
Ireland	■	
Italy		
Japan	■	...
Korea	■	
Mexico	■	
Netherlands		
New Zealand	■	■
Norway		
Portugal		
Slovak Republic	■	
Spain	■	
Sweden		
Turkey	■	
United Kingdom		...
United States		
Algeria
Argentina	■	
Bolivia		
Cambodia		■
Chile	■	
Colombia	■	
Indonesia	■	
Israel	■	
Jordan	■	
Kenya	■	
Morocco	■	
Slovenia	■	
South Africa	■	
Suriname		
Uruguay	■	

Source: The information is from the 2003 survey conducted for the OECD/World Bank Budget Practices and Procedures Database (<http://ocde.dyndns.org/>)

Table P5.1. Agency flexibility in budget execution

There are no restrictions on such transfers	There can be transfers, but only with the approval of the Ministry of Finance/Central Budget Authority	There can be transfers, but only with the approval of the legislature	There can be transfers, but the legislature must be notified of the transfer	There can be no such transfers	Other
Australia					■
Austria	■				
Belgium	■				■
Canada		■			
Czech Republic	■				
Denmark		■			
Finland				■	
France	■				
Germany	■				
Greece				■	
Hungary		■			■
Iceland				■	
Ireland	■				
Italy				■	
Japan		■		...	
Korea					■
Mexico					■
Netherlands	■				
New Zealand		■			
Norway
Portugal					■
Slovak Republic	■				
Spain				■	
Sweden		■			
Turkey	■				
United Kingdom	■				
United States					■
Algeria
Argentina					■
Bolivia					■
Cambodia				■	
Chile	■				
Colombia		■			
Indonesia		■			
Israel					■
Jordan	■				
Kenya	■				
Morocco				■	
Slovenia					■
South Africa				■	
Suriname	■				
Uruguay					■

Source: The information is from the 2003 survey conducted for the OECD/World Bank Budget Practices and Procedures Database (<http://ocde.dyndns.org/>)

Table P6.1. Scope and focus on audit

Are government entities subject to financial audits by an external auditor?		Is there a central Supreme or National Audit Office					
		Yes, reports to the executive branch	Yes, reports to legislative branch	Yes, reports to judiciary branch	No, audits are contracted by individual Ministries	No	Other
Australia	Yes		■				
Austria	Yes		■				
Belgium	Yes		■				
Canada	Yes		■				
Czech Republic	Yes		■				
Denmark	Yes		■				
Finland	Yes	■					
France	Yes			■			■
Germany	Yes		■				
Greece	No
Hungary	Yes		■				
Iceland	Yes		■				
Ireland	Yes		■				
Italy	Yes		■				
Japan	Yes		■				
Korea	Yes						■
Mexico	Yes		■				
Netherlands	Yes		■				
New Zealand	Yes		■				
Norway	Yes		■				
Portugal	Yes		■				
Slovak Republic	Yes		■				
Spain	Yes		■				
Sweden	Yes	■					
Turkey	Yes		■				
United Kingdom	Yes		■				
United States	Yes						■
Algeria
Argentina	Yes		■				
Bolivia	Yes	■					
Cambodia	Yes		■				
Chile	Yes						■
Colombia	Yes						■
Indonesia	Yes		■				
Israel	Yes		■				
Jordan	Yes
Kenya	Yes		■				
Morocco	Yes						■
Slovenia	Yes		■				
South Africa	Yes		■				
Suriname	Yes						■
Uruguay	...		■				

Source: The information is from the 2003 survey conducted for the OECD/World Bank Budget Practices and Procedures Database (<http://ocde.dyndns.org/>)

Table P7.1. Who is responsible for conducting evaluations in the two following cases?

	Case 1: When evaluations are decided as part of the budget process						Case 2: When evaluations are decided outside or the budget process					
	The Ministry of Finance	The Ministry of Planning	The Ministry, Department or Agency in charge of the activity/programme	The manager of the activity /programme	The National Audit Body	The Legislature	The Ministry of Finance	The Ministry of Planning	The Ministry, Department or Agency in charge of the activity/programme	The manager of the activity/programme	The National Audit Body	The Legislature
Australia	■		■				■		■	■		
Austria												
Belgium	■			■	■					■	■	
Canada			■							■		
Czech Republic	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::
Denmark	■		■				■					
Finland			■	■	■					■	■	
France											■	
Germany			■							■		
Greece	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::
Hungary			■							■		
Iceland										■	■	
Ireland			■				■			■	■	■
Italy	■		■	■		■			■	■	■	■
Japan	■		■							■		
Korea	■										■	
Luxembourg	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::
Mexico				■	■	■						
Netherlands	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::
New Zealand			■							■		
Norway	■		■		■							

	Case 1: When evaluations are decided as part of the budget process						Case 2: When evaluations are decided outside or the budget process					
	The Ministry of Finance	The Ministry of Planning	The Ministry, Department or Agency in charge of the activity/programme	The manager of the activity /programme	The National Audit Body	The Legislature	The Ministry of Finance	The Ministry of Planning	The Ministry, Department or Agency in charge of the activity/programme	The manager of the activity/programme	The National Audit Body	The Legislature
Poland	■										■	
Portugal							■		■		■	
Slovakia	■						■					
Spain	■			■	■	■	■	■		■	■	■
Sweden			■						■		■	
Switzerland									■			■
Turkey												
UK	■						■		■	■	■	
United States			■						■			
Chile	■								■			
Israel	■						■		■		■	

Source: This overview is based on the results of the 2005 OECD questionnaire on performance information.

Table P7.2. What type of evaluations are commissioned and/or conducted by the Ministry of Finance on what basis?

Review of ongoing programmes		Expost review of programmes	Review of new initiatives or programmes	Sectoral reviews	Spending reviews
Australia	Ad hoc				
Austria					
Belgium	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc		
Canada	Systematic	Systematic	Ad hoc	Systematic	Systematic
Czech Republic
Denmark	Ad hoc		Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc
Finland	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc
France	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc
Germany					
Greece
Hungary	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Systematic
Iceland			Systematic		Ad hoc
Ireland	Systematic	Systematic	Systematic	Systematic	Systematic
Italy					Ad hoc (and systematic)
Japan	Systematic	Systematic	Systematic		
Korea	Ad hoc		Ad hoc		
Luxembourg
Mexico		Ad hoc		Systematic	Systematic
Netherlands
New Zealand	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc
Norway	Ad hoc		Ad hoc	Ad hoc	
Poland	Systematic	Systematic	Systematic	Systematic	Systematic
Portugal	Ad hoc	Ad hoc		Ad hoc	Systematic
Slovakia	Systematic				Systematic
Spain	Systematic				
Sweden	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc
Switzerland	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc
Turkey					
UK	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Systematic
United States	Systematic			Ad hoc	
Chile	Systematic	Ad hoc	Systematic		Ad hoc
Israel	Ad hoc	Ad hoc	Ad hoc		Ad hoc

Sources: This overview is based on the results on the 2005 OECD questionnaire on performance information.

Table P8.1. Where and how often are evaluations used in the budget process?

In the budget formulation process at the Ministry of Finance/Central Budget Office		In the budget formulation process at ministerial/departmental level	In the budget formulation process at the cabinet level	In the discussion on the budget law in the legislature	Used in the strategic activity and target setting in ministries
Australia	Rarely	Rarely	Rarely	Never	Often
Austria	Rarely	Rarely	...	Rarely	Rarely
Belgium	Rarely	Rarely	Rarely	Rarely	Rarely
Canada	Often	Often	Often	Rarely	Often
Czech Republic
Denmark	Rarely	Rarely	Rarely	Rarely	Often
Finland	Rarely	Often	Often	Often	Often
France	Often	Often
Germany	Rarely	Rarely	Rarely
Greece
Hungary	Rarely	Rarely	Never	Never	Often
Iceland	Never	Rarely	Never	Never	Often
Ireland	Rarely	Often
Italy	Never
Japan	Often	Often	Never	Rarely	Often
Korea	Often	Rarely
Luxembourg
Mexico	Rarely	...	Often	Rarely	Often
Netherlands
New Zealand	Rarely	Rarely	Rarely	Never	Rarely
Norway	Often	Often	Often	Rarely	Often
Poland	All the time	All the time	All the time	All the time	All the time
Portugal	Never	Never	Never	Never	Never
Slovakia	Rarely	Rarely	Never	Never	Never
Spain	Rarely	All the time	Often	...	Often
Sweden	Rarely	Rarely	Rarely	Rarely	Rarely
Switzerland	Often	Often	Often
Turkey
UK	Often	Rarely	Rarely	Rarely	Often
United States	Rarely	Rarely	Never	Rarely	Often
Chile	All the time	Often	Never	Rarely	Often
Israel	Rarely	Rarely	Rarely	Never	Rarely

Source: This overview is based on the results of the 2005 OECD questionnaire on performance information.

Table P8.2. Use of evaluations

	Are the findings of evaluations produced by the spending ministries/departments used in negotiations with the Ministry of Finance?
Australia	Yes, but rarely
Austria	Yes, often
Belgium	Yes, but rarely
Canada	Yes, often
Czech Republic	...
Denmark	Yes, often
Finland	Yes, often
France	Yes, but rarely
Germany	Yes, but rarely
Greece	...
Hungary	Yes, often
Iceland	Yes, but rarely
Ireland	Yes, often
Italy	Yes, but rarely
Japan	Yes, often
Korea	Yes, but rarely
Luxembourg	...
Mexico	Yes, but rarely
Netherlands	...
New Zealand	Yes, but rarely
Norway	Yes, often
Poland	Yes, often
Portugal	No
Slovakia	No
Spain	Yes, in all cases
Sweden	Yes, but rarely
Switzerland	Yes, in all cases
Turkey	...
UK	Yes, often
United States	Yes, often
Chile	Yes, often
Israel	Yes, but rarely

Source: This overview is based on the results of the 2005 OECD questionnaire on performance information.

Table P9.1. Follow-up on evaluations

	Is there a monitoring or follow-up process to examine if the actions or activities recommended by an evaluation are carried out?	Does the national/supreme audit body audit the evaluation function or process of ministries/departments?	Does the national/supreme audit body audit individual evaluations conducted/commissioned by ministries/departments or the Ministry of Finance?
Australia	Yes, in some evaluations	No	Yes, in a few evaluations
Austria	Yes, in some evaluations	Yes	Yes, in some evaluations
Belgium	No	No	...
Canada	Yes, in all evaluations	Yes	Yes, in a few evaluations
Czech Republic
Denmark	Yes, in a few evaluations	Yes	Yes, in some evaluations
Finland	Yes, in some evaluations	Yes	Yes, in some evaluations
France	Yes, in some evaluations	No	No
Germany	Yes, in some evaluations	Yes	Yes, in a few evaluations
Greece
Hungary	Yes, in all evaluations	Yes	Yes, in some evaluations
Iceland	No	No	No
Ireland	Yes, in some evaluations	Yes	Yes, in a few evaluations
Italy	Yes, in some evaluations	Yes	Yes, in some evaluations
Japan	Yes, in some evaluations	No	No
Korea	Yes, in some evaluations	Yes	No
Luxembourg
Mexico	Yes, in some evaluations	Yes	Yes, in some evaluations
Netherlands
New Zealand	Yes, in a few evaluations	No	Yes, in a few evaluations
Norway	Yes, in a few evaluations	Yes	No
Poland	Yes, in some evaluations	Yes	Yes, in some evaluations
Portugal	Yes, in some evaluations	No	Yes, in some evaluations
Slovakia	No	No	No
Spain	Yes, in some evaluations	Yes	Yes, all evaluations
Sweden	Yes, in a few evaluations	Yes	Yes, in a few evaluations
Switzerland	Yes, in some evaluations	Yes	Yes, in some evaluations
Turkey
UK	Yes, in some evaluations	No	No
United States	Yes, in a few evaluations	No	No
Chile	Yes, in all evaluations	No	No
Israel	Yes, in a few evaluations	Yes	Yes, in a few evaluations

Source: 2005 OECD questionnaire on performance information

Table P10.1 Recruitment in the civil service: differences of emphasis

Emphasis on competition for posts and professional experience	Emphasis on competitive examination, education
Australia	Czech republic
Canada	France
Denmark	Greece
Finland	Hungary
Iceland	Ireland
New Zealand	Japan
Norway	Korea
Sweden	Luxembourg
Switzerland	Spain
United Kingdom	
United States	

Table P10.2 Openness of government posts

Policies		Countries
In principle, all levels of posts are open for competition including posts at senior and middle levels	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Switzerland
	... except the most top-level posts which are filled by appointment of government	Australia, Canada, Italy, Norway, Sweden
Posts both at senior and middle levels are partially open for competition		Korea, Luxembourg, UK
No posts are open for competition both at senior and middle levels	Japan, Spain
	... with the exception of some posts at middle level	France, Ireland

Source: OECD (2004), Trends in Human Resources Management Policies in OECD countries: An analysis of the results of the OECD survey on strategic human resources management, Paris.

Table P12.1 Institutional frameworks for pay setting – Collective bargaining types

No Pay bargaining		Single collective bargaining			Two tiers of collective bargaining	
Pay decided on the basis of recommendations by an independent review body	Pay decided on the basis of recommendations by the president	Bargaining for the entire public service	Bargaining by functional sub-sector	Bargaining at the workplace level	Central level + negotiations by professional groups	Central level + negotiations at the work place
Ireland Japan Korea	Czech Republic Mexico United States	Belgium Canada France Germany Ireland Luxembourg Poland Portugal Spain Switzerland	Germany Netherlands	Australia Netherlands New Zealand	Austria Denmark Greece Slovak Republic	Belgium Finland Hungary Iceland Italy Norway Sweden

Source: OECD (2004), Trends in Human Resources Management Policies in OECD countries: An analysis of the results of the OECD survey on strategic human resources management, Paris.

Table P12.2 Participation of unions in decision making on pay

Weak	Relatively strong	Very strong
Australia Hungary (40%) Poland Slovak Republic Spain Switzerland United States (70%)	Canada (86%) Czech Republic France (18%) Germany Greece Iceland (99%) Ireland Japan (55%) Korea (82%) New Zealand (54%) Portugal	Austria Belgium Denmark Finland (80%) Italy (45%) Netherlands (53%) Norway (90%) Sweden (84%) United Kingdom

Note: Numbers between parenthesis correspond to the reported percentage of unionisation in the public service

Source: *OECD* (2004), Trends in Human Resources Management Policies in the OECD countries: An analysis of the results of the OECD survey on strategic human resources management, Paris.

Table P13.1 prevalence of performance-related pay

Is performance related pay in use in your country?		If yes:			Do organisations mostly use:	
		For most government employees	For senior staff only	Only in a few central/national/federal government organisations	One-off bonuses	Merit increments
Austria	No
Belgium	No
Finland	Yes	■		
Hungary	Yes	■				■
Ireland	Yes		■		■	
Japan	Yes	■		
Korea	Yes	■			■	■
Luxembourg	No
Mexico	No
Netherlands	Yes			■	...	■
Norway	Yes		Y	
Portugal	No
Spain	Yes	Y			■	
Slovak Republic	No
Switzerland	Yes	Y				■
United Kingdom	Yes	Y			■	■
United States	Yes	Y			■	■

Source: Preliminary sample results from the Survey on Strategic human resource in government, 2006

Table P14-1: Public service core values stated in public documents in OECD countries

Imparitality, neutrality, objectivity	AUS AUT CAN CZE DEU DNK ESP FIN GBR GRC HUN IRL ISL ITA JPN KOR LUX NLD NOR POL PRT SWE TUR USA
Legality	AUT BEL CAN CHE DEU DNK ESP GBR HUN JPN IRL ISL ITA KOR MEX NLD NOR PRT SWE TUR USA
Integrity, honesty	AUT BEL AUS CAN DEU DNK GBR GRC JPN KOR MEX NLD NZL POL PRT SWE TUR USA
Transparency, openness, proper disclosure of information	CAN FIN ISL GBR GRC IRL LUX MEX NLD NZL NOR PRT SWE USA
Efficiency	AUS CHE DNK ESP GRC HUN IRL ITA MEX NZL NOR PRT SWE USA
Equality	AUS DEU IRL JPN LUX NLD NOR PRT SWE TUR USA
Responsibility, accountability	AUT DEU FRA FIN GBR HUN ISL MEX NZL PRT SWE
Justice, fairness	AUS DEU ESP HUN IRL NZL NOR PRT SWE TUR
Confidentiality, respect of official secrets	AUT CZE DEU FRA IRL JPN KOR NLD SWE USA
Professionalism	AUS BEL DEU HUN IRL KOR POL PRT
Service in the public interest, service to the whole community	CHE DEU ESP HUN JPN PRT SWE
No private interests, no interaction of private and public interests, avoidance of conflict of interest	CAN CZE DEU IRL JPN SWE USA
Obedience	BEL DEU FRA ITA JPN KOR
Respect for State resources	IRL TUR NOR SWE USA
Loyalty, fidelity to the State	DEU ITA KOR NOR TUR
Kindness, humanity	AUS KOR HUN

Note: The following abbreviations are used: AUS (Australia), AUT (Austria), BEL (Belgium), CAN (Canada), CZE (the Czech Republic), DNK (Denmark), DEU (Germany), FIN (Finland), FRA (France), GRC (Greece), HUN (Hungary), ISL (Iceland), IRL (Ireland), ITA (Italy), JPN (Japan), KOR (Korea), LUX (Luxembourg), MEX (Mexico), NLD (the Netherlands), NZL (New Zealand), NOR (Norway), POL (Poland), PRT (Portugal), ESP (Spain), SWE (Sweden), CHE (Switzerland), TUR (Turkey), GBR (the United Kingdom), USA (the United States).

Table P15.1. What activities and situations are identified as holding potential for conflicts of interest for officials?

	Business interest, especially			External activities and positions									Assets	Liabilities, debts	Gifts, benefits and hospitality (for example sponsored travel)	Family relationships	Personal relationship	Other
	Shareholdings	Partnerships	Investments	In a political party	In trade unions	In elected public entity	In an entity with contractual or regulatory relationship with the government	In secondary employment in the private sector	In secondary employment in the public sector	In positions in the private sector whether remunerated or not(e.g. directorships)	In positions in NGOs (e.g. in partnership with the employer organisation of a public official)	In voluntary organisations (e.g. religious, sport etc.)						
Australia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Austria					■		■	■	■	■	■				■	■	■	■
Belgium	■	■	■					■	■	■					■	■	■	■
Canada	■		■		■		■	■	■	■			■	■	■	■	■	■
Czech Republic				■	■	■		■	■	■					■	■	■	■
Denmark	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Finland	■	■			■		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
France	■	■	■				■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Germany								■	■	■					■	■	■	■
Greece	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■			■	■	■	■	■	■

	Business interest, especially			External activities and positions									Assets	Liabilities, debts	Gifts, benefits and hospitality (for example sponsored travel)	Family relationships	Personal relationship	Other
	Shareholdings	Partnerships	Investments	In a political party	In trade unions	In elected public entity	In an entity with contractual or regulatory relationship with the government	In secondary employment in the private sector	In secondary employment in the public sector	In positions in the private sector whether remunerated or not (e.g. directorships)	In positions in NGOs (e.g. in partnership with the employer organisation of a public official)	In voluntary organisations (e.g. religious, sport etc.)						
Hungary		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■					■	■	■	
Iceland													■	■	■	■	■	■
Ireland	■	■	■	■			■	■	■	■			■	■	■	■	■	■
Italy	■	■	■				■	■	■	■			■	■	■	■	■	■
Japan	■	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■		■	■		■	■	■	■
Korea	■	■		■			■	■	■	■					■	■	■	■
Luxembourg	■	■	■				■	■	■	■								
Mexico		■	■	■			■	■	■	■					■	■	■	■
Netherlands			■	■			■	■	■	■		■			■	■	■	■
New Zealand	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Norway	■		■				■	■	■	■					■	■	■	■
Poland	■	■		■	■	■		■	■	■			■	■	■	■	■	■
Portugal	■	■	■				■	■	■	■			■	■	■	■	■	■
Slovakia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■	■	■	■

	Business interest, especially			External activities and positions									Assets	Liabilities, debts	Gifts, benefits and hospitality (for example sponsored travel)	Family relationships	Personal relationship	Other
	Shareholdings	Partnerships	Investments	In a political party	In trade unions	In elected public entity	In an entity with contractual or regulatory relationship with the government	In secondary employment in the private sector	In secondary employment in the public sector	In positions in the private sector whether remunerated or not (e.g. directorships)	In positions in NGOs (e.g. in partnership with the employer organisation of a public official)	In voluntary organisations (e.g. religious, sport etc.)						
Spain	■	■	■				■	■	■	■				■	■	■		
Sweden	■	■				■	■	■	■	■		■		■	■	■	■	
Switzerland						■	■	■	■	■	■			■	■	■		
Turkey	■	■							■	■			■	■	■	■	■	
UK				■				■	■	■				■	■	■	■	
United States	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	

Source: OECD (2003), Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service. OECD Guidelines and Country experiences. Paris.

Table P16.1. Enforcing the conflict of interest policy

	How are public officials informed of the conflict of interest policy?				Who can be consulted if an official is in doubt?				
	The document on conflict of interest policy is provided when entering the office	In training	Included in the entrance examination	Other	Manager	Dedicated person within the organisation	Dedicated person outside the organisation	Telephone help desk	Other
Australia	■	■			■	■			■
Austria	■	■	■		■	■	■		
Belgium		■	■	■	■				
Canada	■			■	■	■	■		
Czech Republic	■				■				
Denmark	■	■	■		■				■
Finland		■		■	■				
France	■	■		■	■	■	■		
Germany			■		■	■			
Greece	■	■			■				
Hungary	■	■	■		■		■	■	
Iceland		■			■				
Ireland	■			■	■	■	■		
Italy	■	■	■		■	■			
Japan	■	■			■	■	■		■
Korea		■	■			■			
Luxembourg		■	■		■				■
Mexico	■	■		■	■			■	
Netherlands	■	■			■	■			
New Zealand	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Norway		■			■				
Poland	■	■		■	■	■			■
Portugal	■				■	■	■	■	■
Slovakia	■	■	■	■	■	■		■	■
Spain		■	■		■				■
Sweden	■	■		■	■				■
Switzerland	■	■			■	■	■		
Turkey		■			■				
United Kingdom	■				■	■			
United States	■	■							

Source: OECD (2003), Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service. OECD Guidelines and Country Experiences. Paris.

Table: P17.1. Conflict of interest policies for post-public employment

	What information is gathered for the decision, and how:						What measures are used to ensure implementation of decisions?				
	Applicants are required to supply factual information relevant to future employment	Applicants are required to give their own assessment on the situation	An official form should be completed	Information is provided in ad hoc form	Advice/counsel is provided for officials on their post-public employment obligations	Other	Record decisions on individual cases for future tracking	Make available information on past decisions for benchmarking	Inform prospective employers of imposed restrictions and conditions	Request information on the application of decisions (e.g. in the form of a periodic report)	Other
Australia						■					
Austria											
Belgium											
Canada	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■			■
Czech Republic											
Denmark											
Finland											
France	■	■	■	■		■	■	■			
Germany	■				■	■				■	
Greece						■					
Hungary											
Iceland											
Ireland	■	■							■		
Italy						■					■

	What information is gathered for the decision, and how:						What measures are used to ensure implementation of decisions?				
	Applicants are required to supply factual information relevant to future employment	Applicants are required to give their own assessment on the situation	An official form should be completed	Information is provided in ad hoc form	Advice/counsel is provided for officials on their post-public employment obligations	Other	Record decisions on individual cases for future tracking	Make available information on past decisions for benchmarking	Inform prospective employers of imposed restrictions and conditions	Request information on the application of decisions (e.g. in the form of a periodic report)	Other
Japan				■			■	■			
Korea	■	■	■						■		
Luxembourg											
Mexico											■
Netherlands											
New Zealand											
Norway	■	■	■	■			■				
Poland											
Portugal	■	■	■								
Slovak Republic											
Spain	■										■
Sweden											
Switzerland											
Turkey											
United	■	■		■			■			■	■

	What information is gathered for the decision, and how:						What measures are used to ensure implementation of decisions?				
	Applicants are required to supply factual information relevant to future employment	Applicants are required to give their own assessment on the situation	An official form should be completed	Information is provided in ad hoc form	Advice/counsel is provided for officials on their post-public employment obligations	Other	Record decisions on individual cases for future tracking	Make available information on past decisions for benchmarking	Inform prospective employers of imposed restrictions and conditions	Request information on the application of decisions (e.g. in the form of a periodic report)	Other
Kingdom United States	■	■	■	■	■	■					■

Source: OECD (2006), *Avoiding Conflict of Interest in Post-Public Employment: Comparative Overview of Prohibitions, Restrictions and Implementing Measures in OECD Countries*. Paris.

Table P18.1. Overview of current legislation and institutions for open government in OECD countries.

	Freedom of information	Privacy/ data protection	Administrative procedure	Ombudsman /Commissioner	Supreme audit institution
Australia	■	■	■	■	■
Austria	■	■	■	■	■
Belgium	■	■		■	■
Canada	■	■		■	■
Czech Republic	■	■	■	■	■
Denmark	■	■	■	■	■
Finland	■	■	■	■	■
France	■	■	■	■	■
Germany		■	■	■	■
Greece	■	■	■	■	■
Hungary	■	■	■	■	■
Iceland	■	■	■	■	■
Ireland	■	■		■	■
Italy*	■	■	■	■	■
Japan	■	■	■		■
Korea	■	■	■	■	■
Luxembourg		■	■	■	■
Mexico	■		■	■	■
Netherlands	■	■	■	■	■
New Zealand	■	■	■	■	■
Norway	■	■	■	■	■
Poland	■	■	■	■	■
Portugal	■	■	■	■	■
Slovakia	■	■		■	■
Spain	■	■	■	■	■
Sweden	■	■	■	■	■
Switzerland	■	■	■		■
Turkey	■				■
United Kingdom	■	■	■	■	■
United States		■	■		■
EU	■	■		■	■

*No national Ombudsman, but extensive coverage provided by sub national ombudsman institutions. A government-appointed commission oversees implementation of the law on access to public information.

Table P19.1. Major laws regulating electronic data and services

Legal topic	EU directive	Netherlands	Hungary	Turkey
E-Procurement	EU directive on public procurement including article on e-procurement [2004/18/EC, Article 33]	Implemented in 2005	Government decrees 167/2004 and 168/2004	n.a.
Re-Use of public data	EU directive on re-use of public data regulating the possible usage of public data [2003/98/EC]	Implementation in 2005 as an amendment to the Dutch Government Information Act from 1991	Act in the Freedom of information by Electronic Means (XC/2005)	The Law on the Right to Access Information (9 October 2003/4982) Bylaw on the Implementation of the Law on Right to access information (19 April 2003)
E-Commerce	EU E-Commerce Directive [2000/31/EC]	Passed by the Parliament in May 2004. Unlike most other EU member states, this transposition does not take the form of a horizontal e-commerce law but of a series of amendments to existing laws and regulations.	Act on Electronic Commerce and Information Society Services adopted the 18 December 2001	Amendments to the Law on Consumer Protection (6 March 2003/4822) Bylaw on Implementation Principles and Procedures of Remote Contracts (13 June 2003)
Liberalisation of telecommunications markets in Europe	Five directives constituting the new EU regulatory framework for the liberalisation of the European telecommunications markets: The framework directive, the access directive, the universal services directive, the authorisation directive and the privacy directive	The new Telecommunications Act entered into force in 2004	Liberalisation of telecommunications market (Act C/20039IX.22.))	Universal Service law (25 June 2005/5369) Amendments to the Law on Privatisation Procedures (21 July 2005/5398) Amendments to the Law on Telegram and Telephone (12 May 2001/4673)
E-Signatures	EU Directive on electronic signatures regulating the framework for recognised electronic signatures [1999/93/EC]	Community framework for electronic signature implemented in 2003	Decree on E-signatures Decree (194/2005)	The Law on E-Signatures (23 January 2004/5070) Bylaw on the Implementation of e-signatures Law (6 January 2005)

Legal topic	EU directive	Netherlands	Hungary	Turkey
E-Invoicing (VAT collection)	EU directive on e-invoicing with regard to value-added tax collection regulating conditions for using e-invoicing with collection of value-added tax [2001/115/EC amending 77/388/EEC]	Implemented 2003	Decree on E-invoicing (20/2004 (IV.21.))	Amendments to the law on Tax Procedure (7 August 2003/4962) Amendments to the Laws on VAT, Stamp Tax, Expenditure Tax (2 January 2004/5035) Amendments to the Law on Income tax (31 July 2004/5228)
Privacy	EU directive on privacy and electronic communications [2002/58/EC]	The Personal Data Protection Act was adopted by the Dutch Parliament in July 2000 and came into force on 1 September 2001	Decree on privacy and electronic communications (226/2003 (XII.13.))	The New Turkish Penal Code (12 October 2004/5237)
Data protection	EU directive on data protection regulating protection of personal data [95/46/EC]	“Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens” (Personal Data protection Act) from 2000	The Personal Data Protection Act LXIII/1992	n.a.

Sources: OECD based on OECD E-government survey: Netherlands (2006) and IDABC Factsheet: Netherlands eGovernment (2005), Hungary eGovernment (2005), European Commission, (2006).

Table P20.1. Interconnectivity and Interoperability

	Does a common technical platform (i.e. enterprise architecture) exist for central government?	Does a common information architecture or a Standardisation Board exist for central government?
Australia		4
Austria		4
Belgium		
Canada	4	
Czech Republic		
Denmark	4	3
Finland		
France		
Germany	4	4
Greece		
Hungary	4	3
Iceland		
Ireland		4
Italy		
Japan		
Korea		
Luxembourg		
Mexico		
Netherlands	2	3
New Zealand		4
Norway		4
Poland		
Portugal		
Slovakia		
Spain		
Sweden		
Switzerland		
Turkey	1	1
United Kingdom	4	4
United States	4	

Note: 1 = no, 2 = under construction, 3 = structure in place, but still in developmental stage, 4 = operational; common standards issued

Sources: OECD e-Government Studies for Finland, Norway, Mexico, Denmark, Hungary, Turkey and the Netherlands; other country data from country reports, web research and country survey.

Table P22.1. The types of performance measures that have been developed (by country)

	What types of performance information are produced to assess government performance?			What is assessed?			
	Performance measures	Evaluation; in-depth, impact, cost/effectiveness etc	Benchmarking	Efficiency	Economy and productivity	Quality	Effectiveness
Australia	■	■		■		■	■
Austria	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Belgium		■	■	■	■		
Canada	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Czech Republic
Denmark	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Finland	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
France	■	■		■	■	■	■
Germany	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Greece
Hungary	■	■		■	■	■	...
Iceland	■	■		■	■	■	■
Ireland	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Italy	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Japan	■	■		■	■	■	■
Korea	■	■		■			■
Luxembourg
Mexico	■	■		■	■	■	...
Netherlands
New Zealand	■	■		■	■	■	■
Norway	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Poland	■	■	■		■	■	
Portugal	■			■	■		■
Slovakia	■	■					■
Spain	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Sweden	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Switzerland		■				■	■
Turkey	■				■	■	■
United Kingdom	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
United States	■	■					■
Chile	■	■		■	■	■	■
Israel	■	■			■	■	■

Source: 2005 OECD questionnaire on performance information. All answers are self-reported.

Table P22.2. Types of performance measure used

	What type of performance measures have been developed?					
	Outputs only	Outcomes only	Combination of outputs and outcomes	Unit cost of outputs	None	Other, <i>please specify below:</i>
Australia			■	■		These have been developed but not systematically
Austria			■			
Belgium				■		
Canada			■			Internal process measures
Czech Republic						
Denmark	■					
Finland			■	■		
France		■		■		
Germany			■	■		
Greece						
Hungary	■					
Iceland			■	■		
Ireland				■		
Italy			■			
Japan			■			
Korea			■			Most cases is output oriented and very few based on outcomes
Luxembourg						
Mexico	■					
Netherlands						Performance measures (indicators) for outcomes aren't universally developed across all parts of Government. Unit costs of outputs are determinable when a standard output is produced.
New Zealand	■			■		
Norway			■	■		
Poland			■			
Portugal			■			
Slovakia			■			
Spain			■	■		In general, outcomes are in a developmental stage
Sweden			■	■		
Switzerland			■			
Turkey			■	■		Some departments/agencies have developed outcomes for particular areas
United Kingdom			■			
United States			■	■		
Chile			■	■		
Israel			■	■		

Sources: 2005 OECD questionnaire on performance information. All answers are self-reported.

	The Ministry of Finance					The Ministry of Planning					Ministry/Department/Agency in charge of the programme				
	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures
Netherlands	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::	::
New Zealand	■		■	■	■					■	■	■	■	■	
Norway			■	■	■					■	■	■	■	■	
Poland	■	■	■	■	■					■		■	■	■	■
Portugal	■	■	■	■	■					■	■	■	■	■	■
Slovakia	■		■	■	■						■	■	■	■	■
Spain	■		■								■	■	■	■	■
Sweden					■						■	■	■	■	■
Switzerland											■	■	■	■	■
Turkey					■					■		■	■	■	■
UK	■	■	■	■	■						■	■	■	■	■
United States			■	■	■						■	■	■	■	■
Chile	■	■	■	■	■						■	■	■	■	■
Israel	■	■	■	■	■						■	■	■	■	■

Source: Curristine, T. (2005), Performance Information in the Budget process: Results of OECD 2005 Questionnaire, OECD Journal on Budgeting, Volume 5, Number 2, OECD, Paris.

Table P23.2. Roles and responsibilities in performance management systems

	Evaluation unit within each Ministry/Department					The National Audit Body					The Legislature					Other external institutions: universities, research enterprises, consultancies, etc.				
	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures
Australia																				
Austria						■														
Belgium						■		■						■						
Canada	■	■	■	■		■		■			■			■		■				■
Czech Republic
Denmark																				
Finland								■										■		
France								■												
Germany										■										
Greece
Hungary								■			■	■						■		
Iceland						■		■			■									
Ireland	■	■	■			■														
Italy			■					■												

	Evaluation unit within each Ministry/Department					The National Audit Body					The Legislature					Other external institutions: universities, research enterprises, consultancies, etc.				
	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures
Japan		■	■	■																
Korea						■														
Luxembourg
Mexico	■	■	■			■		■			■		■					■		■
Netherlands
New Zealand	■	■	■	■		■			■	■	■	■	■	■	■					■
Norway						■					■	■	■	■						
Poland								■		■	■	■	■	■				■		■
Portugal	■		■					■		■	■	■	■							■
Slovakia											■									
Spain	■		■			■				■					■					
Sweden																				
Switzerland											■		■							■
Turkey						■														
UK	■		■		■	■		■		■	■		■		■		■			■
United States																				
Chile																				

	Evaluation unit within each Ministry/Department				The National Audit Body				The Legislature				Other external institutions: universities, research enterprises, consultancies, etc.							
	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures	Commissioning evaluations	Setting performance measures	Monitoring progress against measures	Applying performance results in resource allocation and/or programme or policy decisions	Horizontal support for developing performance measures
Israel																				

Source: OECD (2005), Curristine, T. (2005), Performance Information in the Budget process: Results of OECD 2005 Questionnaire, OECD Journal on Budgeting, Volume 5, Number 2, OECD, Paris

Table P24.1. Use of performance measures in the budget process

	Does the Ministry of Finance eliminate programmes when the results show poor performance?	Does the Ministry of Finance/Central Budget Office eliminate activities/programmes when the evaluations show poor performance?
Australia	Rarely	Yes, but rarely
Austria	Never	No
Belgium	Never	No, it is the task of the relevant Ministry
Canada	Rarely	Yes, but rarely
Czech Republic
Denmark	Never	No, it is the task of the relevant Ministry
Finland	Rarely	No, it is the task of the relevant Ministry
France	Never	No
Germany	Rarely	No, it is the task of the relevant Ministry
Greece
Hungary	Rarely	No, it is the task of the relevant Ministry
Iceland	Never	No, it is the task of the relevant Ministry
Ireland	Rarely	Yes, but rarely
Italy	Never	No, it is the task of the relevant Ministry
Japan	Rarely	Yes, but rarely
Korea	Rarely	Yes, often
Luxembourg
Mexico	Rarely	No
Netherlands
New Zealand	Rarely	Yes, but rarely
Norway	...	No, it is the task of the relevant Ministry
Poland	Yes, often	Yes, often
Portugal	Rarely	No
Slovakia	Never	
Spain	Rarely	No, it is the task of the relevant Ministry
Sweden	Never	No, it is the task of the relevant Ministry
Switzerland	Never	No
Turkey	...	
United Kingdom	Rarely	Yes, but rarely
United States	Rarely	Yes, but rarely
Chile	Rarely	Yes, but rarely
Israel	...	Yes, often

Source: 2005 OECD questionnaire on performance information. All answers are self-reported.

Table P25.1. Staffing of Government Office – civil servant or political appointee?

	The staff of the GO is primarily		The staff of the PMO is primarily		The Head of the GO is	
	Civil servants	Political appointee	Civil servants	Political appointee	Civil servants	Political appointee
Australia	■			■	■	
Austria	■		■		■	
Belgium	■		■	■	■	■
Czech Republic	■			■		■
Denmark	■		■		■	
Finland	■			■		■
France	■		■		■	
Germany	■		■			■
Greece	■		■			■
Hungary	■		■			■
Iceland	■		■			
Ireland	■		■		■	
Italy	■		■			■
Japan	■		■			■
Korea	■		■		■	
Luxembourg	■		■		■	
Netherlands	■		■		■	
New Zealand	■			■	■	
Norway			■		■	
Poland	■		■			■
Portugal		■		■		■
Slovakia	■		■			■
Spain	■			■		■
Sweden	■			■		■
Switzerland	■		■			■
Turkey	■		■		■	
United Kingdom	■		■		■	

Source: OECD (2004), A Comparative Analysis of Government Offices in OECD Countries. Paris.

Table P25.2. Strategic planning units

	Is there a strategic planning unit and if so, where is it located?	How many employees work for the unit?	Is there a unit to prepare annual plans, work plans, legislative plans?	How many employees work for the unit?
Australia	PMO	5	No unit	...
Austria	No unit	...	No unit	...
Belgium	PMO	18	GO&PMO	28
Czech Republic	GO	2	GO	17
Denmark
Finland	No unit	...	No unit	...
France	GO	2	GO	16
Germany	...	15	GO	5
Greece	PMO	12	No unit	15
Hungary	GO	31	GO	51
Iceland	No unit	...	PMO	2
Ireland	PMO	50	No unit	...
Italy	PMO	10	PMO	...
Japan	GO&PMO	...	GO&PMO	...
Korea	GO	5	GO	5
Luxembourg	GO/PMO	...	GO&PMO	...
Netherlands	GO/PMO	2	No unit	...
New Zealand	No unit	...	No unit	...
Norway
Poland	No unit	...	GO	...
Portugal	GO	...	No unit	...
Slovakia	GO	4	GO	15
Spain	PMO	46	GO&PMO	46
Sweden	GO	100	GO	...
Switzerland	GO	5	GO	15.6
Turkey	No unit	337	GO	...
United Kingdom	No unit	...	GO	27

Source: OECD (2004), A Comparative Analysis of Government Offices in OECD Countries. Paris.

Table P25.3. Are the civil servants in the GO normally seconded from other Ministries?

Most/all employees seconded	Small number of employees seconded	No employees seconded
France	Australia	Austria
Germany	Czech Republic	Belgium
Greece	Finland	Hungary
Japan	Korea	Iceland
	Netherlands	Ireland
	New Zealand	Italy
	Norway	Luxembourg
	Portugal	Poland
	United Kingdom	Slovak Republic
	Turkey	Spain
		Sweden
		Switzerland

Source: OECD (2004), A Comparative Analysis of Government Offices in OECD Countries, Paris.

Table P26.1. Communication by Government Offices

	Is there a communication unit and if there is, where is it located?	How many employees work for the communication unit?
Australia	PMO	8
Austria	PMO	44
Belgium	PMO	3
Czech Republic	GO	13
Denmark
Finland	GO	10
France	PMO	...
Germany
Greece	PMO	7
Hungary	GO	28
Iceland	No unit	...
Ireland	PMO	14
Italy	PMO	5
Japan	GO&PMO	...
Korea	PMO	7
Luxembourg	No unit	...
Netherlands	GO	63
New Zealand	<i>PMO</i>	3
Norway
Poland	GO	36
Portugal	GO	...
Slovakia	GO	10
Spain	GO	24
Sweden	GO&PMO	...
Switzerland	GO	4
Turkey	GO	15
United Kingdom	GO&PMO	GO38, PMO62

Source: OECD (2004), A Comparative Analysis of Government Offices in OECD Countries, Paris.

Table P27.1. Policy drivers for regulatory quality

Functions of the body in charge or regulatory oversight							
	Consulted as part of the process of developing new regulation	Reports on progress made on reform by individual ministries	Authority of reviewing and monitoring regulatory impacts conducted in individual ministries	Conducts its own analysis of regulatory impacts	Advocacy programme to promote regulatory quality and reform	Advisory body receiving references from Government to review broad areas of regulation, collecting the views of private stakeholders	Specific minister accountable for promoting progress on regulatory reform
Australia	■	■	■		■	■	■
Austria	■	■			■		■
Belgium	...	■		■	■	■	■
Canada	■	■	■		■	■	■
Czech Republic			■		■		
Denmark	■	■		■	■		
Finland	■				■		■
France
Germany	■	■	■	■	■		
Greece	■	■	■	■	■		
Hungary	■			■	■		■
Iceland	■		■	■	■		■
Ireland	■		■	■	■	■	■
Italy	■		■		■		■
Japan	■	■				■	■
Korea	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Luxembourg	■	
Mexico	■	■	■	■	■		■
Netherlands	■	■	■	■	■		■
New Zealand	■		■		■		
Norway		■
Poland					■	■	■
Portugal	■	■	■	■	■		
Slovakia
Spain					■		■
Sweden		■
Switzerland	■		■	■	■	■	
Turkey	■		■
United Kingdom	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
United States	■	■	■	■	■		■
EU	■		■		■	■	

Source: OECD (2006), Indicators of regulatory management systems quality, Paris.

Table P28.1. Linking regulatory policy and other policy areas, forward planing or regulatory activities

	Consultation on new regulation						Forward planning of primary laws		Forward planning of subordinate regulations	
	Body for Competition policy		Body for Trade policy		Body for Consumer policy		Periodical publication of list of laws to be prepared, modified or reformed in the next six months or more	Publication easily available to the public (via the Internet)	Periodical publication of list of regulations to be prepared, modified or reformed in the next six months or more	Publication easily available to the public (via the Internet)
	Usually consulted	Consultation mandatory	Usually consulted	Consultation mandatory	Usually consulted	Consultation mandatory				
Australia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■		...
Austria	■		■	■	■	■	■	■		
Belgium	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Canada			■	■	■		■	■	■	■
Czech Republic	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■		...
Denmark	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■		...
Finland	■		■		■		■	■	■	■
France	
Germany	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Greece	■	...	■	■	
Hungary	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Iceland	
Ireland	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■		...
Italy	■	...	■	...	■		
Japan	■	■	■		■		
Korea	■		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Luxembourg		■		...	■		
Mexico	■	■		■	■
Netherlands	■	■	■	■		■	
New Zealand	■	■	■	■		■	
Norway	■	■	■	■			■	■		...
Poland	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■	■
Portugal	■	■		■	
Slovak	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■	■

	Consultation on new regulation						Forward planning of primary laws		Forward planning of subordinate regulations	
	Body for Competition policy		Body for Trade policy		Body for Consumer policy		Periodical publication of list of laws to be prepared, modified or reformed in the next six months or more	Publication easily available to the public (via the Internet)	Periodical publication of list of regulations to be prepared, modified or reformed in the next six months or more	Publication easily available to the public (via the Internet)
	Usually consulted	Consultation mandatory	Usually consulted	Consultation mandatory	Usually consulted	Consultation mandatory				
Republic Spain	■	■	■	...	■	...	■	■	■	■
Sweden	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Switzerland	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Turkey	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
United Kingdom	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
United States	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
EU	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■

Source: OECD (2006), Indicators of regulatory management systems quality, Paris.

Table P29.1. Forms of public consultation

	Informal consultation with selected groups		Broad circulation of proposals for comment		Public notice and comment		Public meeting		Internet		Advisory group		Preparatory public commission		Other	
	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation
Australia	■	■	N
Austria	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	...	■	■	...	■
Belgium	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Canada	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Czech Republic	■	■	■	■
Denmark	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Finland	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
France	■	■	■	■
Germany	■	■
Greece	■	...	■	...	■	...	■	...	■	...	■	...	■
Hungary	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Iceland	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	...	■
Ireland	■	■	■	...	■	...	■	...	■	...	■	■	■	■
Italy	■	■	■	■	■	■
Japan	■	■	■	■	■	■
Korea	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Luxembourg	■	■	■	■	■	■
Mexico	...	■	...	■	...	■	...	■	■	■	■
Netherlands	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
New Zealand	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Norway	■	■	■	■	...	■	■
Poland	...	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Portugal	■	■	■	...	■
Slovak Republic	■	...	■	■	■	■	■
Spain	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Sweden	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Switzerland	■	■	■	...	■	■	...	■	■	■
Turkey	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■

	Informal consultation with selected groups		Broad circulation of proposals for comment		Public notice and comment		Public meeting		Internet		Advisory group		Preparatory public commission		Other	
	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation
United Kingdom	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
United States	■	■	...	■	...	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
EU	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■

Table P29.2. Openess of the consultation process

	Participation open to any member of the public		Views of participants in the consultation process made public		Requirement to respond in writing to the authors of consultation comments		Views expressed in the consultation process included in the RIA		Process to monitor the quality of the consultation process (e.g. surveys)	
	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation
Australia	■	...	■	■			■	■		
Austria	■	■	■				■	■		
Belgium	■	...	■
Canada	■	■		■				■	■	■
Czech Republic			■				■			
Denmark			■	■						
Finland	■	■		■			■	■		
France										
Germany								
Greece	■	...	■	...	■	...	■
Hungary	■		■							
Iceland			■	■	■	■	■	■		
Ireland			■	■		...
Italy							■	■		
Japan	■	■	■	■						
Korea	■	■	■	■	■	■				
Luxembourg			■	■			■			
Mexico	■	■		■				■		
Netherlands			■				■	■		
New Zealand	■	■	■	■			■	■		
Norway	■	■	■	■			■			
Poland	■	■	■		■	■	■	■		
Portugal							■	■		
Slovak Republic			■	■			■	■		
Spain					■	■				
Sweden	■	■	■	■			■	■		
Switzerland	■	■	■	■	■	■			■	...
Turkey	...		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■

	Participation open to any member of the public		Views of participants in the consultation process made public		Requirement to respond in writing to the authors of consultation comments		Views expressed in the consultation process included in the RIA		Process to monitor the quality of the consultation process (e.g. surveys)	
	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation	Laws	Sub-ordinate regulation
United Kingdom	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
United States		■		■		■		■		
EU	■	■	■	■			■	■		

Source: 2005 OECD Regulatory Indicators Questionnaire, GOV/PGC/REG(2005)12/ANN1

Table P30.1. Use of regulatory tools and processes

	Regulatory Impact Analysis		Assessment of regulatory alternatives		Consultation with affected parties		Plain language drafting requirements		Systematic evaluation of regulatory programmes*	
	Spec. sectors or pol. areas	Gvt. Wide	Spec. sectors or pol. areas	Gvt. Wide	Spec. sectors or pol. areas	Gvt. Wide	Spec. sectors or pol. areas	Gvt. Wide	Spec. sectors or pol. areas	Gvt. Wide
Australia	...	■	...	■	...	■	...	■	...	■
Austria	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Belgium	■	■			■	■	■	■	...	■
Canada	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■		■
Czech Republic	■		■		■			■		
Denmark	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■		
Finland	■	■	■	■	■	■		■	...	■
France	■				■	■	■	■	■	■
Germany	...	■	...	■	...	■	...	■	■	...
Greece	■	...	■	...	■	...	■
Hungary	...	■	...	■	...	■	...	■	...	
Iceland	■		■	■	■	■				
Ireland	...	■	...	■	...	■	...	■	■	...
Italy	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Japan	...	■	■	
Korea	...	■	...	■	...	■	...	■	...	
Luxembourg	■	■	■	■	■	■				
Mexico	■		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Netherlands	■	...	■	...	■	...	■
New Zealand	■		■	■	■	■	■	■		
Norway	■		■		■	■	■	■		
Poland	■		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Portugal	■		■		■	■	■	■		
Slovakia	■	...	■	...	■	...	■
Spain	■				■	■	■	■	■	
Sweden	■		...	■	...	■	...	■	■	...
Switzerland	■	...	■	...	■	■	...

	Regulatory Impact Analysis		Assessment of regulatory alternatives		Consultation with affected parties		Plain language drafting requirements		Systematic evaluation of regulatory programmes*	
	Spec. sectors or pol. areas	Gvt. Wide	Spec. sectors or pol. areas	Gvt. Wide	Spec. sectors or pol. areas	Gvt. Wide	Spec. sectors or pol. areas	Gvt. Wide	Spec. sectors or pol. areas	Gvt. Wide
Turkey			■		■	■	■	■	■	
United Kingdom	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
United States		■		■	■	■		■	■	
EU	■	■			■	■	■	■	■	

Note: For more details on the questions, see: a(i), a(ii), a (iii), a(iv), a(v), b(i), b(ii), b(iii), b(iv), b(v) / 2005 OECD regulatory indicators questionnaire GOV/PGC/REG (2005)12/ANN1. *This corresponds to ex-post evaluation.

Source: OECD (2006), Indicators of regulatory management systems quality, Paris.

Table P31.1. Regulatory Impact Analysis – assessment of specific impacts

	Budget	Competition	Market openness	Small businesses	Specific regional areas	Specific social groups	Other groups (charities, not for profit sector)	On the public sector
Australia	No	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always
Austria	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always	In other selected cases	No	Always
Belgium	Always	No	No	Always	In other selected cases	Only major regulation
Canada	Always	No	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always
Czech Rep.	Always	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	No	In other selected cases	No	No
Denmark	Always	Always	Always	Always	Only major regulation	In other selected cases	Only major regulation	Always
Finland	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always
France
Germany	Always	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	Always	In other selected cases	Always	In other selected cases	Always
Greece	Always	Always	Only major regulation	Always	...	Always
Hungary	Always	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases
Iceland	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always	Only major regulation	Only major regulation	Always
Ireland	Always	Always	Always	Always	...	Always	Always	No
Italy	Always	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	Always
Japan
Korea	Always	Always	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	Always
Luxembourg	No	No	No	Always	No	No	No	Always
Mexico	Always	Always	Always	Always	In other selected	Always	No	Always

	Budget	Competition	Market openness	Small businesses	Specific regional areas	Specific social groups	Other groups (charities, not for profit sector)	On the public sector
Netherlands	Always	Always	Always	Always	cases	No	No	No
New Zealand	Always	Always	Always	Always	No	Always	Always	Always
Norway	Always	Only major regulation	Only major regulation	Always	Always	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	Always
Portugal	Always	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	Always	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	Always
Slovak Rep.	Always	Always	Always	Always	...	Always
Spain	Always	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases
Sweden	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases
Switzerland	Always	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	Only major regulation	In other selected cases	Always	In other selected cases	Always
Turkey
UK	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always
USA	In other selected cases	No	No	Always	No	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	Only major regulation
EU	Only major regulation	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	In other selected cases	No	In other selected cases

Source: OECD (2006), Indicators of regulatory management systems quality, Paris.